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The burden of debt 
and the crisis: 
is it time for a 
unilateral solution? 
Robert Devlin* 
Hitherto Latin America's adjustments to debt servic-
ing requirements have taken the form of a contraction 
of imports and of the economy as a whole, which is 
producing perverse effects not only in the economic 
but also in the social and political spheres. In view of 
these consequences, this process cannot be allowed to 
continue, and must be replaced by a positive adjust-
ment, based on the strengthening of the region's pro-
ductive capacity; but this positive adjustment, in turn, 
will be possible only if appropriate solutions are found 
for the external debt problem, 
In the author's opinion, the "first-best" solution 
would be a multilateral settlement involving the credi-
tor banks, their governments and the debtor coun-
tries; a "public bad" like the external debt problem 
should be collectively tackled. But a collective solution 
has a major drawback, inasmuch as the relatively long 
time that its formulation would take would prevent the 
debtor countries from obtaining the immediate relief 
that they need. Accordingly, the author considers two 
possible "second-best framework which might serve as 
the basis for a positive adjustment. The first would 
consist in a bilateral agreement between the debtor 
countries and the banks, on much more reasonable 
terms than have been seen so far, while the second 
would imply unilateral action on the part of the debtor 
countries for the purpose of imposing a moratorium 
or converting the debt into long-term bonds. A uni-
lateral solution may involve a high cost for the debtor 
countries over the medium and long term, but it could 
become the only available option if reasonable multi-
lateral or bilateral agreements are not reached and if 
no sustained recovery of the international economy 
takes place. 
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The current debt crisis in Latin America clearly 
requires quick remedial action; without it effi-
cient adjustment will become all but impossible. 
Measures to alleviate the crisis will have to be 
adopted at the national, international and re-
gional levels. The time dimension will also have 
to be taken into account, since in sorting out 
possible solutions it is important to distinguish 
between measures that can provide immediate 
relief and those that are longer-term proposi-
tions. 
The time factor is critical; in Latin America 
the debt problem has ceased to be a theoretical 
issue and is now one of great practical urgency. 
Latin America needs relief from the crisis today; 
clearly, for large segments of the Latin American 
population "there is no tomorrow", and conse-
quently socio-economic tensions in the borrow-
ing countries have reached unprecedented 
levels. As President Osvaldo Hurtado of Ecuador 
said in his opening address at the Latin American 
Economic Conference held in Quito in January 
1984, "failure to resolve our countries' economic 
crisis might generate a new source of serious and 
destabilizing social and political conflicts which 
will inevitably upset the precarious world 
balance".! 
The countries of the region have adopted 
exceptional measures to achieve the necessary 
adjustment and meet their commitments with 
their creditors.2 But the adjustment has been 
undertaken in a recessive world economic en-
vironment. At the same time, the unbalanced 
structure of international financial markets ren-
ders it unable to supply adequate amounts of 
anti-cyclical financing in face of the depressive 
trends in both trade and private finance. Hence 
the present adjustment can be described as per-
verse; it has been achieved in essence via a 
dramatic compression of imports and unpre-
cedented falls in per capita income. 
In at least one important respect the adjust-
ment in Latin America may possibly be complete; 
'See El Mercurio (Chile), 13 December 1983, p. B.l. 
2For data and analysis respecting this subject, see Enri-
que Iglesias, "Preliminary overview of the Latin American 
economy during 1983", in the present issue of the Review. 
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after a 41 % reduction in the volume of imported 
goods in 1982-1983 it is difficult to believe that 
there is any "fat" left in the region's import struc-
ture. For this reason it is of paramount impor-
tance that Latin America should avoid further 
reductions of its purchases abroad. 
But the problem does not lie only in calling a 
halt to the squeezing of vital imports. Latin 
America's rapid adjustment process has been 
somewhat artificial; it has been motivated by des-
peration and has been negative inasmuch as it 
was accomplished largely at the cost of weaken-
ing the region's productive capacity. A positive, 
efficient adjustment is one that comes about by 
strengthening productive capacity, and this in 
turn requires, among other things, economic re-
structuring, investment, reactivation and greater 
capacity to import.3 
Unfortunately, the weight of Latin Amer-
ica's debt service —even after the first round of 
reschedulings in 1982-1983— leaves little or no 
margin for economic growth and the recovery of 
1. The public nature of the debt crisis 
The current debt crisis in Latin America must be 
viewed as a public problem, or, in technical jar-
gon, as a "public bad". A public bad is one in 
which a considerable part of the costs of any 
given situation is borne not by those responsible 
but by others, i.e., the costs are externalized from 
the standpoint of the agents producing them. 
These "negative externalities" are felt both by 
creditors and by debtors and have important im-
plications for policy. 
From the debtor's standpoint, the debt ser-
vicing problems of a major borrower—i.e.,Mex-
3For an analysis of this problem and of a positive adjust-
ment, see A. Gurrieri and P. Sáinz, "Is there a fair and 
democratic way out of the crisis?", CEPAI. Review No. 20, 
August 1983, pp. 127 to 148. 
international reserve positions. Thus, any type of 
economic recovery cum restructuring would re-
quire new and direct remedies to relieve the bur-
den of the debt. 
In theory, the best way of tackling the debt 
crisis is to be found at the international and re-
gional levels, but, owing to political and eco-
nomic obstacles, such a solution cannot be put 
into practice promptly enough to provide the 
immediate relief which Latin America will so 
urgently need in 1984 and 1985. The borrower 
countries will therefore have to explore other, 
second-best solutions. 
Two possibilities are considered here. One 
involves a bilateral arrangement with the banks 
for a rescheduling on terms consonant with a 
positive adjustment. The other consists in uni-
lateral action via moratoria or through con-
version of the debt into long-term bonds. Each of 
these alternatives will be analysed so as to eval-
uate its efficiency in relieving the current burden 
of the external debt. 
ico in mid-1982— created a panic in financial 
markets; bankers were quick to perceive Mex-
ico's difficulties as a "Latin American problem", 
and the consequent general restriction of new 
loans swiftly pulled almost all the other Latin 
American debtors into the vortex of the crisis. 
The importance of this negative externality in 
the development of the crisis comes more clearly 
to light when it is recalled that in normal market 
conditions debtors are invariably allowed to re-
pay loans with the contraction of new ones.4 With 
4See P. Dhonte, Clockwork debt, Lexington, Mass., Lex-
ington Books, 1979, chapter 6; W.A. Lewis, The evolution of the 
international economic order, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press, 1977, pp. 65 to 66; and R. Devlin, "External finance 
and commercial banks. Their role in Latin America's capacity 
to import between 1951 and 1975", CEPAL Review No. 5, first 
half of 1978, pp. 63 to 97. 
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the spilling-over of Mexico's negative image of 
creditworthiness to almost all Latin American 
countries, these latter lost the very resources 
(new loans) that had been permitting the smooth 
servicing of private bank debt for the past 15 
years. What is more, until the two big borrowers 
—Brazil and Mexico— regain their image of 
creditworthiness, it will be difficult for other 
debtors in the region to restore normal relations 
with their creditors, whatever efforts the 
authorities may make on behalf of adjustment. 
From the standpoint of the banks, the nega-
tive externalities are equally significant and tend 
to aggravate the problem. For example, in the 
present crisis a bank could not extend new cred-
its to a country without knowing whether the 
other creditors would do the same; otherwise, 
new loans granted by the bank in question would 
be applied simply to pay off loans from other 
institutions that were withdrawing from the mar-
ket, without much benefit for the borrower and 
with considerably increased risk for the lending 
bank. Negative externalities are also present in 
the so-called "market solution" to the debt prob-
lem. Thus, losses on a portfolio that are derived 
from poor risk assessment by an individual lend-
ing institution could very well spark a panic in 
financial markets, which might have deleterious 
effects on the viability of other institutions that 
have not technically erred in the evaluation of 
their own risks in individual countries. This lat-
ter externality was graphically exemplified in the 
market turmoil of 1974 generated by the bank-
ruptcy of the Bank Herrstatt in Western Ger-
many, an institution of no great importance in 
the international banking system. 
Externalities also abound when one seeks to 
pinpoint just where the blame, and therefore the 
costs, should lie. Again, according to the conven-
tional theory which assumes that all decisions by 
economic actors are made independently, the 
costs ought to be borne by inefficient lenders, 
since on the basis of risk assesments they charged 
premiums to which recourse should be had when 
the risks materialize. In the real world, however, 
things are not so simple. As has already been 
pointed out, externalities will prevent the inci-
dence of losses from being limited to banks which 
followed poor lending criteria. But what is more, 
risk evaluation by creditors in the 1970s was not 
carried out independently. In fact, the govern-
ments of the OECD countries strongly encour-
aged banks to lend to developing countries, both 
directly —through exhortations to recycle petro-
dollars— and indirectly, through: i) an expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policy which pro-
duced excess liquidity in the bank system; ii) the 
discrepancy between tight regulation of home 
financial markets and total lack of control of 
international markets; and iii) failure to support 
international credit institutions such as the 
World Bank, IDB and the International Mone-
tary Fund, which could have afforded a more 
appropriate alternative for recycling petrodol-
lars. 
Additional negative externalities were 
generated by the structure of financial markets 
itself. The banking system has two tiers: the big 
international banks that search out markets and 
evaluate risk, and medium-sized and small banks 
which provide the bulk of the funds and lend 
largely on the basis of the assessments made by 
the big banks. Furthermore, the big internation-
al banks themselves are locked into an oligopolis-
tic structure and do not make lending decisions 
independently of what they expect their com-
petitors will do. 
Lastly, when looking at the problem from the 
debtors' viewpoint, it should be recalled that dur-
ing the 1970s the Latin American countries bor-
rowed on the basis of their own needs and deci-
sions, but were also encouraged to do so by the 
arguments in vogue in important international 
technical circles, to the effect that bank credits 
were "cheap" in real terms and that foreign in-
debtedness was "good business". 
In short, then, a great "public problem" is 
posed. In terms both of the causes of the crisis 
and of its own nature, the banks, their govern-
ments and the borrower developing countries 
face important interdependencies which condi-
tion all solutions to the crisis and suggest that a 
sharing of the costs is appropriate. 
2. A public problem demands a public solution 
A sine qua non for efficient adjustment in Latin 
America and a lasting resolution of the crisis is a 
co-ordinated effort on the part of the OECD gov-
ernments to reactivate their economies and bring 
interest rates down to historical levels. If Latin 
America's terms of trade had been similar to 
those prevailing in 1980 (25% higher), and if at 
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the same time real interest rates had mirrored 
those in force at the time when the bulk of the 
debt was contracted (4 points lower), the region 
would have at its disposal an additional 25 billion 
dollars, enough to meet debt service without a 
dramatic compression of imports and hence of 
economic growth.5 Moreover, this is terrain in 
which debtors, creditors and their governments 
have strong common interests: economic recov-
ery would reduce unemployment and social ten-
sions both in the North and in the South, while a 
fall in interest rates would promote recovery and 
normal debt payments would be resumed with-
out jeopardizing the profits of the lending in-
stitutions. 
The absence of a strong and sustained recov-
ery in the OECD countries, debt service will cloud 
Latin America's growth prospects and, in the 
context of the short-leash rescheduling policy 
applied by the private banks,6 will continue to 
take up a disproportionate share of bankers' and 
developing country authorities' time. Neverthe-
less, proposals abound to alleviate the problem 
by joint multilateral public action. A summary of 
the contents of some of these proposals, based on 
data prepared by Martine Guerguil is presented 
in table 1. In addition to these general ideas, 
specific measures have frequently been sug-
gested in relation to reform of the international 
financial system. They include the following: 
— increasing available long-term financing 
from the World Bank via a change in the 
gearing ratio of this institution; 
— authorizing direct access by the Internation-
al Monetary Fund to private capital markets; 
— promoting co-financing between the World 
Bank and private banks; 
5See Enrique Iglesias, op. cit. 
6In the present crisis the banks have agreed to resche-
dule only one or two years of maturities with their amortiza-
tion in only 8 years. The "new" loans intended in practice to 
refinance part of interest payments have to be negotiated 
annually. For further background data on the nature of debt 
renegotiation, see R. Devlin, "Renegotiation of Latin Amer-
ica's debt: an analysis of the monopoly power of private 
banks", CEPAL Review No. 20, August 1983; pp. 101 to 112; 
and ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1982, Santiago, 
Chile, United Nations, 1983, Part I. 
7See also Brandt Commission, North-South: a program for 
survival, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1980. 
— eliminating the concept of graduation for 
middle-income countries; 
— modifying the International Monetary 
Fund's conditionality; and 
— stepping up the importance of programme 
loans by the World Bank. 
At the regional level there also are many 
proposals for assisting Latin America to over-
come the crisis. Among these the following are 
included:8 
— freezing the level of protectionism and 
promoting the expansion of regional trade 
and preference systems; 
— broadening and interconnecting the various 
interregional financial programmes, such as 
mult i lateral payments mechanisms,9 
schemes for balance-of-payments support,10 
import credit insurance plans,11 and institu-
tions dedicated to the financing of 
projects;12 
— enlarging the functions of the Inter-
American Development Bank; and 
— securing an effective, direct and confidential 
interchange of information with respect to 
8For a complete review of this subject see C. Alzamora 
and E. Iglesias, "Bases for a Latin American response to the 
international economic crisis", CEPAL Review No. 20, August 
1983, pp. 17 to 46; and the Latin American Economic Con-
ference, Declaration of Quito and Plan of Action, Quito, 9 to 13 
January 1984, in the present issue of the Review. 
9Cámara de Compensación Centroamericana, (Centrai 
American Clearing-House), Sistema Compensatorio Multi-
lateral de Pagos del Caribe (Caribbean Multilateral Settle-
ment System); and Sistema de Compensación de Saldos y 
Créditos Recíprocos de ALADI (ALADI, System for Settlement 
of Reciprocal Balances and Credits). 
10Acuerdo de Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo Agree-
ment); Fondo Centroamericano de Estabilización Monetaria 
y Fondo para Financiar Saldos Deudores en la Cámara de 
Compensación Centroamericana (Central American Mone-
tary Stabilization Fund and Fund for Financing Debit 
Balances in the Central American Clearing-House). 
"Latin American Export Bank; Sistema Andino de 
Financiamiento del Comercio y Asociación Latinoamericana 
de Organismos de Seguros de Crédito a la Exportación 
(Andean Trade Financing System and Latin American Asso-
ciation of Export Credit Insurance Agencies). 
I2Central American Bank for Economic Integration; 
Caribbean Development Bank; Corporación Andina de 
Fomento (Andean Development Corporation); and Fondo 
Financiero de la Cuenca del Plata (River Plate Basin Financ-
ing Fund). 
THE BURDEN OF DEBT AND THE CRISIS: IS IT TIME FOR A UNILATERAL SOLUTION? / Robert Devlin 111 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF SELECTED PROPOSALS TO ALLEVIATE THE DEBT CRISIS 
Government A new window in the International Monetary Fund that would provide lightly conditional Finance 
of Mexico8 to countries facing interest payments in excess of 2% real. This represents an expansion of the 
concept underlying the Fund's current Compensatory Finance Facility. 
Kenenb In this scheme private banks would trade their LDC loans for 10-15 year bonds to be issued by a 
newly-created OECo-supported international organization. The loans would be traded at a 10% 
discount and the devaluation of the banks' assets would allow the new institution to reschedule I.DC 
loans on more favourable terms. 
Weinertc Private banks would trade their LDC loans for bonds to be issued by the World Bank and the Bank in 
turn would reschedule the loans on better terms. The trade would be at face value, but the bonds 
would carry a reduced interest rate; this would distribute losses over a longer period than would be 
the case under the Kenen plan, with its immediate 10% devaluation of assets. 
Zombanakisd The IMF would extend its adjustment programme to 10-15 years. The private banks would then 
reschedule their loans in a way compatible with the longer adjustment programme and in turn 
would receive an International Monetary Fund Guarantee for the later maturities of the resched-
uling. 
Botin and It is proposed that a new public institution be established to provide loans that bridge the gap 
Del Cantoe between the short-term maturities of private banks and the longer-term maturities of multilateral 
lenders. A bigger financing role is also envisaged for OECD export credit agencies. As for the 
fluctuation in interest rates, it is suggested that the World Bank provide residual finance that would 
effectively guarantee a maximum interest rate for debtor countries. 
Leverf On the basis of an evaluation of what constitutes a reasonable current account deficit, countries 
should have made available to them a maximum amount of finance. This evaluation will be made in 
conjuction with the International Monetary Fund. Bank loans in this programme also should enjoy 
OECD government guarantees. 
Avramovic6 Both propose increases in LDC liquidity via new issues of Special Drawing Rights (SDRS). 
Massadh 
Source: Data from M. Guerguil, "La crisis financiera internacional: diagnósticos y prescripciones", F.CLA, Economie 
Development Division, mimeographed text, November 1983. 
a
 "Facilidad para el financîamiento del déficit de balanza de pagos provocado por las altas tasas de interés", 
mimeographed text, August 1983. 
b
 P. Kenen, "A bail-out for the banks", New York Times, 6 March 1983. 
c
 R. Weinert, "Banks and bankruptcy", Foreign Policy, No. 52, Spring 1983, pp. 138-149. 
d
 M. Zombanakis, "The international debt threat: A way to avoid a crash", The Economist, 30 April 1983, pp. 11-14. 
e
 W. BolinandJ. Del Canto, "LDC debt: beyond crisis management", Fomg7iA//flir.(, Summer 1983, Vol.61, No. 5, pp. 
1099-1112. 
f
 H. Lever, "The international debt threat: A concerted way out", The Economist, 9 July 1983, pp. 18-20. 
8
 D. Avramovic, "The debt problem of developing countries at end-1982", Aussenwirtschaft, March 1983, pp. 65-86. 
h
 C. Massad, "The external debt and the financial problems of Latin America", CEPAI. Review, No. 20, August 1983, pp, 
149-163. 
the terms on which the said countries' exter-
nal debt is refinanced and rescheduled.13 
In spirit and intent, all these proposals are 
along the right lines; public problems do indeed 
l sSee Alzamora and Iglesias, op. cit.; and Latin Amer-
ican Economic Conference, op. cit. 
demand public solutions. But their efficacy is 
handicapped by the aforementioned time ele-
ment: most of the proposals are at best medium-
term propositions. It must be recalled that an 
economic system based on private markets tends 
to underproduce public solutions (i.e., public 
"goods"). Furthermore, pressures for a public 
solution are usually minimal until the external-
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ized costs of a problem are internalized by the 
system's major economic agents. So far, the abil-
ity of the banks and their governments to resche-
dule debts on terms highly favourable to them-
selves has enabled the North to keep the costs of 
the debt crisis externalized; in other words, the 
debtor countries have had to bear them while any 
benefits have largely accrued to the creditors.14 
Another disincentive to action is the opinion held 
by some OECD governments that the crisis has 
already been resolved by the first round of re-
schedulings and by the recovery of the United 
States economy. Only if the developing countries 
begin to enter into non-negotiated moratoria will 
the cost become a reality in the North, and it 
would be then that OECD governments could be 
A public solution to the crisis, while entirely de-
sirable, does not seem feasible in the near future. 
This reduces the field of action to the national 
level, where a response could be: i) a bilateral 
agreement between the borrowing country and 
its creditor banks involving a rescheduling of the 
debt compatible with a positive adjustment pro-
cess; or ii) unilateral action taken by the borrow-
er to relieve the burden of debt service. Which of 
the two solutions is the second-best for the debtor 
count ry will d e p e n d upon the hypotheses 
adopted with respect to the world economy, the 
characteristics of the debt problem and the cur-
rent disposition of the banks. 
Latin America must reduce its external vul-
nerability by restructuring its relations with for-
eign creditors and adopting new development 
and indebtedness strategies.16 Nevertheless, the 
region presumably will seek and need future ex-
l 4A recent study by A. Fishlow points out that the nine 
biggest United States banks obtained excess profits totalling 
between US$ 70 and US$ 130 million in 1983, as a result of 
the renegotiations with the Third World. See El Mercurio 
(Chile), 16 January 1984, p . B. l . 
l aFor example, the current United States administra-
tion for a long time opposed any expansion of the Interna-
expected to take rapid and concerted action 
aimed at achieving public solutions. The moral 
of this story is simple: modern market economies 
tend to privatize profits and socialize losses; until 
the threat of losses is felt to be real, public 
solutions are unlikely to materialize on any 
significant scale.15 
Solutions at the regional level also encounter 
formidable obstacles. T h e main difference, 
however, is that the costs of the crisis have 
already been internalized by the region's most 
important economic actors, thus giving greater 
impetus to regional solutions. But in any event, 
time remains an important factor and regional 
agreements cannot be expected to provide im-
mediate relief from the debt crisis. 
ternal financing. The merit of a bilateral settle-
ment involving a rescheduling on terms conso-
nant with a positive adjustment process is that it is 
less conflictive than unilateral action and thereby 
serious negative repercussions on future access 
to credit may be avoided. But a bilateral resche-
duling solution —even if on terms favourable to 
the region— is not sufficient to secure future 
financing: if the world economy does not enter 
upon a sustained expansion and if interest rates 
do not come down to normal levels, there will be 
little chance of a restoration of autonomous pay-
ment capacity in most countries, no matter how 
hard they try to adjust. Thus, servicing problems 
on past debt accumulation will recur, making net 
resource transfers from the banks in the future 
very problematical indeed. This latter situation, 
in turn, would greatly reduce the opportunity 
cost of unilaterally imposing on creditors a type 
tional Monetary Fund quotas. Only when Mexico was on the 
verge of financial collapse (and hence so were some United 
States banks) did it support an enhancement of the Fund's 
role in Third World Financing. 
l6See the article by Gurrieri and Sáínz, op. cit., which 
outlines some relevant ideas. 
I l l 
The second-best solution: Bilateral or unilateral action? 
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of very long-term development-oriented re-
payment scheme that probably would be impos-
sible to put into effect in a framework of bilateral 
negotiations. 
There are two other situations in which uni-
lateral action might prove to be the preferred 
solution. The first, when there is unexpected 
intransigence on the part of private creditors. As 
pointed out elsewhere,17 the extremely burden-
some terms imposed by the banks in the 1982-
1983 reschedulings generate what are tanta-
mount to monopoly rents obtained in a non-
competitive capital market thanks to strong bar-
gaining power that the banks acquire by nego-
tiating en bloc with the borrower, through the 
mechanism of the banking advisory committee. 
This being so, the most appropriate frame of 
reference for the debtors' action vis-à-vis the 
creditors would be a bilateral monopoly with the 
two countries negotiating the sharing-out of the 
losses on a very weak bank portfolio. If countries 
took this situation into account —instead of be-
having as if they were rivals— both theory and 
practice suggest that Latin America could in all 
likelihood make better use of its bargaining pow-
er to strike rescheduling terms compatible with a 
positive adjustment process —all this with no 
very serious negative repercussions on access to 
credit. Nevertheless, should the banks, for what-
ever reason, prove unbending in their bargain-
ing stance, a country which needs relief now 
might then have no alternative but to take uni-
lateral action to reduce the debt burden and 
stimulate its economic growth. 
The second situation involves countries 
which face severe internal constraints on raising 
repayment capacity. These countries are, for all 
practical purposes, insolvent, and even a recov-
ery in their terms of trade would be insufficient 
to restore repayment capacity. Once again the 
future prospects for positive net transfers from 
the banks would be meagre, possibly making the 
cost of imposing a very long-term repayment 
scheme on the banks less prohibitive. 
irSee R. Devlin, "Renegotiation of Latin America's 
debt...", op. cit. 
1. The bilateral approach 
a) The general strategy 
As a point of departure, the general hypothesis 
adopted is that to relieve current political ten-
sions and to protect the stability of the interna-
tional financial system, not only must Latin 
America's per capita income not fall farther, but 
it must now rise, and begin to recoup the severe 
losses incurred during 1981-1983.18 It would be 
eminently reasonable to set a minimum growth 
target of 5% per annum for 1984-1986. Assum-
ing a rather conservative marginal import coeffi-
cient for Latin America of 1.3 (that reigning in 
1967-1973), imports would have to expand at the 
very least by 7% per annum in real terms. Inter-
national reserves would also have to rebound 
from today's critically low levels. 
The options open can be depicted in the 
following simple external resource equation: 
X - M - R = L + L a - i D - A 
X = exports 
M = imports 
La = arrears on debt service 
R = change in reserves 
L = new loans 
i = average interest rate 
D = external debt 
iD = interest payments 
A = amortization payments 
Let it be assumed that imports (M) and re-
serves (R) must rise. This can be achieved in a 
situation of external resource balance by a com-
pensatory expansion of exports (X); or by some 
combination of increased new loans, accumula-
tion of debt service arrears, lower interest rates 
on the debt outstanding or rescheduling of 
amortization (A) and/or interest payments (iD) 
on the debt in question. In the current world 
economy where export demand is sluggish and 
protectionism is rampant, it is fair to assume that 
export growth will be problematical and relative-
ly exogenous to the region's internal efforts. In 
present conditions it will also be difficult to 
'See E. Iglesias, op. cit. 
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obtain new autonomous loans and the prospects 
for lower interest rates are not very promising in 
the immediate future. Thus, in the near future a 
rise in imports and reserve cover will probably 
have to be achieved via arrears or reschedulings. 
Bankers have displayed great concern about 
avoiding accounting losses on their portfolio. 
This is reflected in their reluctance to declare 
defaults and their willingness to reschedule 
amortization payments and extend loans to 
facilitate payments of interest, thereby disguis-
ing from bank supervisors the non-performing 
nature of their assets.19 Unilateral action on the 
part of borrowers involving long-term repay-
ment of the debt would expose this tactic as it 
would saddle the banks with the book losses that 
they so desperately try to avoid. Latin America's 
bargaining strength lies in exploiting this prefer-
ence and allowing the banks to go on in the same 
way, always providing they agree to rescheduling 
on terms that facilitate a positive adjustment in 
Latin America. The time may be ripe for putting 
such a strategy to practice, inasmuch as increas-
ing pressure at the international level, in certain 
influential circles in the banks' own countries,20 
and consternation in the borrower countries, 
l9Interest rates are so high that the burden of interest 
payments alone would suffice to create a financial crisis. For 
example, in 1982-1983 over 35% of the value of the region's 
exports was absorbed by payments under this head, and in 
some countries the coefficient reached 50% or more (see E. 
Iglesias, op. cit., table 14). In these circumstances, the mere 
rescheduling of amortization payments —the traditional re-
lief mechanism— would not have been enough to restore 
debt servicing capacity. However, by rescheduling interest 
payments, the banks incur the risk that their government 
bank authorities may classify the loans as non-performing 
assets and cause a write off of part of the value of their 
portfolio. Accordingly, the banks resort to the indirect expe-
dient of refinancing interest payments through new loans, 
thereby evading losses (see R. Devlin, "Renegotiation of Latin 
America's debt...", op. ck.). 
20For example, in a new Act of the United States Con-
gress respecting an increase in that country's IMF quota, it is 
proposed that under economic adjustment programmes 
short-term debts at high rates of interest should be converted 
into long-term debts, at rates appreciably lower than those 
prevailing in the restructuring of bank debts negotiated be-
tween August 1982 and August 1983, for countries receiving 
help from the Fund intended for economic adjustment pro-
grammes with a view to minimizing the burden of adjustment 
for the debtor country. See Organization of American States, 
"Extracto de la Ley Pública 98-181 del Congreso de los Esta-
dos Unidos titulada: Ley de Viviendas Nacionales y de Re-
have apparently helped to predispose the banks 
to soften repayment terms (and reduce monopo-
ly rents) in the second round of reschedulings for 
Mexico and Brazil, in 1984.21 Moreover, there 
may be room for nudging the banks farther on 
this point.22 
The basic premise for a bilateral solution is 
that the costs for the banks of a settlement 
favourable to debtors' interest should be 
obscured; i.e., attempts should be made to avoid 
accounting losses for the banks, even while im-
posing real losses upon them. The reasons for 
this strategy will become clearer in the subse-
quent analysis of unilateral action; suffice it to 
say now that the goal of such a strategy is to 
preserve prospects for future financing from 
private creditors. 
How to disguise or obscure the losses for the 
banks? The answer is to push out all payments 
into the future without hardening lending terms 
—indeed, the terms must be softened. The banks 
make sacrifices in two respects. First, in resched-
uling loans on relatively less favourable terms, 
they become locked into assets which offer less 
returns than would be available from alternative 
opportunities. Secondly, by softening terms in 
relation to the original conditions of the loan, the 
present value of the future income stream is re-
duced. Even though the banks are worse off than 
before, they need not suffer accounting losses if 
the revised terms of credit meet the minimum 
requirements for the transaction to be success-
fully disguised as commercial. The reschedul-
ings must have a "commercial flavour" in order 
cuperación Internacional y Estabilidad Financiera", OEA/SER 
H/XIV/CEFYC/4, 10 January 1984. 
2
'Brazil is known to have obtained a softening of debt 
terms: provisional data suggest that the renegotiation for 
1984 implies a reduction of the spread over LIBOR from 2.5% 
to 2%, and of commissions from 1.5% to 1.0%. Mexico, for its 
part, will pay 1.5% over LIBOR and a commission of 0.625% on 
its "new" loan of US| 3.8 billion; these figures are lower than 
the 2.25% over LIBOR and commissions of 1.25% settled for its 
additional loans in 1983. A 10-year maturity will be granted, 
with a grace period of 6 years, as compared with the 6-year 
maturity (3 grace years) for the new loan in the year before. 
22The fact that Brazil managed to obtain softened credit 
terms at the very time of an aggravation of its crisis and an 
accumulation of debt service arrears to the tune of US$ 3 
billion is an empirical indication of the monopoly rents tap-
ped by the banks in the first round of reschedulings. 
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that they may fall into a "gray area" that will give 
the regulatory banking authorities of the OECD a 
legitimate way to turn a blind eye rather than 
classifying the loans as non-performing assets. 
And this, in all likelihood, is what they will do, if 
the alternative is an international banking crisis. 
b) The terms of an agreement 
Assuming that whatever world economic 
upturn that may materialize will have more 
gradual effects on Latin America than has 
normally been the case in recoveries since the 
Second World War, and assuming likewise that 
in the near future nominal and real interest rates 
will remain exceptionally high, rough and ready 
estimates would suggest that for Latin America 
to grow at an average annual rate of 5% in the 
triennium 1984-1986, and begin a modest re-
cuperation of its international reserves, it will 
need to reschedule all its amortization payments, 
and on average have 80% of its interest payments 
rescheduled or refinanced. 
In this light, bankers and debtor countries 
should devise a rescheduling package that at a 
minimum would cover the triennium 1984-1986, 
although ideally the two should pursue a restruc-
turing of the entire stock of debt owed to the 
banks. It is absolutely essential to eliminate the 
traumatic yearly rescheduling exercises which 
waste so much of the government authorities' 
and bankers' time, create uncertainties, and in-
hibit restoration of a normal credit environment 
for Latin America. Thus, a debt relief package 
providing a definitive once-and-for-all arrange-
ment for upcoming payments is called for. In-
cidentally, the new debt relief package could 
coincide with the International Monetary Fund's 
extended adjustment programmes, thus afford-
ing bankers the backing of the Fund's con-
ditionality. 
Amortization of debt, however, is really not 
the problem, as bankers have shown a disposition 
to reschedule. The real bottleneck to recovery in 
Latin America, and where the focus of attention 
must lie, is the payment of interest. The banks 
—under pressure from IMF— have been re-
financing about 50% of interest payments. Even 
so, the countries' gross domestic product con-
tinues to fall, inasmuch as large foreign trade 
surpluses have to be generated (in the face of 
external constraints on export performance) to 
cover the outstanding balance of interest pay-
ments, which is very large on account of the 
exceptionally high level reached by nominal in-
terest rates. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, formulas 
must be found for still further reducing these 
interest payments on a cash flow basis. 
Therefore, as an integral part of the resched-
uling agreement creditors should provide an ex 
ante guarantee of 80% refinancing of interest 
payments23 during the period 1984-1986. This 
could very well involve a front loaded sliding 
scale, e.g., 90% in 1984; 80% in 1985, and 70% in 
1986, to take into account the possibility of a 
gradual improvement in the world economy and 
somewhat lower international interest rates. A 
historically useful instrument called a "bisque 
clause" also could be inserted into the agreement 
to provide for less automatic refinancing of in-
terest payments in the event of a dramatic and 
unforeseen change for the better in the world 
economic situation and/or a plummeting of in-
terest rates.24 
The rescheduled amortization payments 
and refinanced interest should bear a repayment 
schedule that pushes against the limit of what 
could be considered a commercial transaction. 
Evidently this should involve maturities of at 
least 10 to 12 years (with a 6-year grace period), 
since a 10-year amortization period (with 6 grace 
years) was agreed to in the second round of the 
Mexican rescheduling and 12 years was awarded 
to Nicaragua in 1980; all this with no negative 
repercussions or sanctions on the part of the 
creditors' local banking authorities. But an even 
more acceptable goal would be 15 years (with a 
6-year grace period), a maturity plan that banks 
extended with some frequency on loans during 
29This guarantee, of course, would be lied to com-
pliance with IMF adjustment targets, which might be less 
severe, since countries would have more financing at their 
disposal as a result of the greater rollover of interest pay-
ments. 
24Bisque clauses were employed by the United States 
Government in the case of some of its post-war loans. For 
example, in 1945 the government made a US$ 4-billion loan 
to the United Kingdom, to be repaid over 50 years, in which a 
bisque clause allowed the repayment schedule to adjust to the 
economic conditions of the borrower. See G. Abbott, "The 
case for cancellation", Inter-Economics, No. 7, July 1975, pp. 
217-221. 
116 CEPAL REVIEW No. 22 / April ¡984 
the 1970s.25 On the other hand, a 20 -year amor-
tization period, repeatedly proposed in Latin 
American forums, risks crossing the threshold of 
tolerance of local banking supervisors, since it 
represents a period that is traditionally beyond 
the bankers' business horizon and enters the ter-
rain of institutional investors. While OECD gov-
ernment guarantees on the tailend maturities 
could obviate this drawback, such a scheme 
would overstep the constraints —self-imposed 
here— of a bilateral arrangement. 
The margins over LIBOR —another of the 
elements determining the negotiated cost of cred-
it— that would be'charged on rescheduled debt 
and refinanced interest payments, would have to 
be as low as possible, yet satisfy the requirements 
of commercial practice. This would involve 
spreads well below those charged in the first 
round of 1982-1983 reschedulings,26 and in 
most cases below those originally negotiated. 
The limits to be defined here are part of the 
vagaries of the "cat and mouse" game character-
istic of the negotiating framework of a bilateral 
monopoly. But even within the banking com-
munity itself there have appeared proposals to 
the effect that while the banks could not accept a 
spread below their (marginal) cost of funds 
(which is LIBOR), a 1 % spread would be feasible as 
a temporary measure. An even better arrange-
ment, however, would be either a 1% spread, or 
the margin originally negotiated on the debt to 
be rescheduled or refinanced, whichever were 
lower. This would allow countries like Mexico, 
Z5Such 15-year loans were common in the early phase of 
the expansion of bankers' activities in developing countries, 
that is, in the first half of the 1970s. See World Bank, Borrow-
ing in International Capital Markets, Supplement EC 181, 
Washington, D.C., August 1976, annexes. 
2 6I.e., between 2.25% and 2.50% over LIBOR. See R. 
Devlin, "Renegotiation of Latin America's debt...", op. cit., 
table 3. 
27See P.P. Kuczynski, "Latin American debt: act two", 
Foreign Affairs, Autumn 1983, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 118-138. 
Moreover, Robert Roosa —financial expert, partner in the 
Brown Brothers Harriman investment bank, and formerly a 
high official of the United States Treasury— has declared 
that interest rates for reschedulings ought to approximate 
the LIBOR and that in future IMF must concern itself not only 
with the granting of new loans by the banks but also with their 
terms. See "Robert Roosa delivers Struc Memorial Lecture 
emphasizing a broader role for the Fund 8c Bank", ¡MF Survey, 
15 December 1983, p. 374. 
with traditionally excellent images of creditwor-
thiness, to approach their normal negotiated cost 
of credit (which is below 1%); most of the other 
countries, for their part, would enjoy a spread 
somewhat lower than that originally agreed 
upon. There is, moreover, a precedent for this 
inasmuch as in the bank restructuring of United 
States and Canadian corporate debts special 
"soft" market rates of interest were applied. 
Indeed, eminent experts in the OECD area have 
recommended that this strategy for problem 
debtors in domestic markets be extended to the 
international plane.28 
As for commissions, in principle they should 
not be charged in the rescheduling/refinancing 
package, since this is a case of administration of 
existing debt on which commissions were paid at 
the time of obtaining the loans. However, in 
keeping with normal banking practices there is 
no reason why payment of commissions could 
not be agreed to in exchange for an interest 
spread somewhat lower than that proposed here. 
Lastly there is now a consensus in world 
forums to the effect that the cost imposed by the 
private banks in the first round of debt renego-
tiations was unduly high. Debtors could demand 
an adjustment of this cost through new agree-
ments under which credit terms may be settled 
on more liberal principles along the lines sug-
gested here. 
c) Co-operation among debtor countries 
Achieving the above rescheduling conditions 
is a question of bargaining power. As noted 
earlier, the banks' ability to impose conditions 
may have been somewhat eroded by negative 
reactions in certain influential circles of the 
centre and the periphery against the overly 
burdensome charges on reschedulings. 
The Latin American countries could bring 
additional pressure to bear by two means. The 
simplest and least controversial measure would 
be an exchange of information among the coun-
tries concerning the bargaining tactics of the 
banks. This idea, which was proposed by the 
Executive Secretaries of ECLA and SELA in a Plan 
28See R. Roosa, op. at., and R. Weinert, "Banks and 
Bankruptcy", op. cit., pp. 138-149. 
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of Action presented to President Hurtado of 
Ecuador in 1983,29 would help to counterbal-
ance the advantages enjoyed by the banks which 
exchange information through the banking 
committee as well as through a new institute re-
cently organized by them in Washington, D.C. In 
the first round of reschedulings, borrowing 
countries negotiated in relative secrecy, to little 
advantage, as witnessed by the fact that the terms 
of the agreements are practically identical for all 
the different countries. The establishment of a 
credit information system in an existing regional 
institution might prove to be an easy way to en-
hance the Latin American countries' bargaining 
power. 
A second measure, considerably more com-
plicated and controversial, implies direct co-
operation among borrowers in negotiating with 
the private banks. Even if a borrower recognizes 
that the correct negotiating framework is that of 
a bilateral monopoly, for diverse reasons there 
could be considerable asymmetry in the bargain-
ing power of the parties. Likewise, for some bor-
rowers, particularly those with a politically less 
than favourable international image, the cost of 
being the first to break new ground in the pat-
tern of reschedulings might be very high as 
banks might retaliate harshly, just to set an exam-
ple and discourage similar action by other coun-
tries. Joint action would help to obviate these 
drawbacks. While the proposals for a regional 
cartel would almost certainly be impracticable, 
because of the cumbersome administration it 
would involve and the reluctance of most coun-
tries to participate, there is no reason why one or 
several smaller groups of countries with similar 
negotiating interest should not voluntarily join 
forces ad hoc in order to pressure the banks into a 
more rational relief package. While it is true that 
each country's circumstances are different, it is 
no less certain that all have a common interest in 
better terms for the restructuring of debt. 
d) Stabilization of interest payments 
The average 80% refinancing of interest 
payments means that cash payments to the banks 
would represent a low percentage of debt out-
'See Alzamora and Iglesias, op. cit. 
standing. This is quite reasonable, inasmuch as 
even cash payments equivalent to a "normal" real 
interest rate of 2% would be very burdensome in 
the current abnormal world economic condi-
tions. For example, in the case of Brazil, after 
refinancing of interest payments, the balance of 
interest paid on a cash basis in 1983 amounted to 
roughly 2% of its bank debt in real terms. To 
make this payment, the per capita product had to 
fall by 7%. Thus, in the short-term interest pay-
ments in cash must be well below 2% real. Never-
theless, as a proposal for the future, if and when 
the world economy returns to some degree of 
stability, it would be constructive to establish a 
real rate of interest ceiling around a "normal" 
rate —say 2% real— on bank loans, with any 
balance over that being capitalized with interest 
by creditors.30 This would provide debtors with a 
measure of stability in interest payments. Moreo-
ver, the international financial markets would 
then have an "automatic" mechanism to roll over 
interest payments and thereby avert the trauma 
and the uncertainties that excessively high inte-
rest rates generate in financial markets via their 
negative and transitory effects on the borrowers' 
debt servicing capacity. 
2. The unilateral approach 
Mention has been made of three situations in 
which a bilateral rescheduling agreement on 
quasi-commercial terms might not prove to be 
the preferred solution for the borrower: 1) a 
rigid bargaining stance on the part of the banks 
that unduly delayed implementation of a new 
rescheduling framework compatible with posi-
tive adjustment; 2) failure of world economic re-
covery and persistence of high interest rates ; and 
3) a very serious structural disequilibrium within 
a country. 
The first situation is more or less self-
explanatory. The second is not conducive to a 
bilateral commercial agreement, since even if the 
countries could negotiate a margin as low as 1 % 
on a rescheduling, this would imply an effective 
interest rate of 1 \%, assuming a LIBOR of around 
30In the 1960s the banks often established ceiling and 
floor rates for loans with a floating rate of interest; but no 
capitalization mechanism existed and the system therefore 
lost its attraction for the banks. 
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10%. If 80% of these payments were refinanced, 
debt would grow by at least 9% per annum. This 
growth of debt would only make economic sense 
if Latin American exports were to recover their 
dynamism over the period 1984-1986. Without 
renewed dynamic export growth —which would 
necessitate strong economic expansion in the 
OECD area— or a sharp drop in interest rates 
(which would reduce refinancing requirements 
and therefore debt expansion), Latin America 
would just sink deeper and deeper into the quag-
mire of having to reschedule on commercial 
terms. As regards the third situation, a country 
facing severe internal supply constraints might 
also find difficulty in meeting the commitments 
of a commercial rescheduling, since its capacity 
to export —and hence its opportunity to take 
advantage of better terms of trade— would be 
limited. In these circumstances, it would be 
worthwhile to explore the possibilities of im-
posing a non-commercial repayment pro-
gramme. 
The two unilateral solutions most discussed 
in Latin America are a moratorium31 and uni-
lateral conversion of debt into long-term 
bonds.32 The two solutions are very similar, since 
the proponents of a moratorium are not suggest-
ing repudiation of the debt, but rather a tempo-
rary halt in current commercial repayment sche-
dules and their replacement by very long-term 
debt service programmes. In this context, too, 
there would be no need to submit to an Interna-
tional Monetary Fund adjustment programme. 
While the precise terms of repayment differ 
among the various proponents of these schemes, 
they are much alike in principle. Payment on 
interest and principal would be halted for a 
period of 2 to 5 years, the principal being reim-
bursed over 20 to 30 years. Interest rate propos-
als vary from less than market rates to 2% real.33 
The immediate value of these plans is that 
they would: 1) provide considerable and instant 
3lThe best-known proponent of this solution is Celso 
Furtado, of Brazil. 
32See R. Dornbusch, "A stabilization program for 
Brazil", Cambridge, Mass., mimeographed text, 1983, and 
Conferencia Económica Latinoamericana, op. cit. 
33What has not been mentioned, and would be even 
more appropriate, is a real interest rate calculated on the basis 
not of international inflation, but of the borrower's terms of 
trade. 
relief from the burden of debt; 2) offer a repay-
ment stream that is a good deal more compatible 
with development than any commercial scheme 
that would conceivably be acceptable to the 
banks; and 3) eliminate the need for endless 
multiple reschedulings with their ensuing waste 
of time and resources.34 In other words, they 
would extricate the countries once and for all 
from the so-called debt trap. Also, faced with any 
of the three above-mentioned conditions, such 
plans would allow a borrower to take the inevi-
table step —free itself from an insupportable debt 
service burden— without being accused of re-
pudiation of foreign obligations. 
Another potential benefit, often cited by 
proponents of unilateral debt conversions into 
bonds, is that such an emission would help to 
create a secondary market for Latin America 
debt paper. On the one hand, this would allow 
the banks to rid themselves of unwanted assets by 
selling them off in such a market. On the other 
hand, countries would gain valuable information 
on their creditworthiness via the fluctuations of 
the market value of their paper. Likewise, any 
sharp devaluation of assets in the market could 
provide potential debt relief via an opportunity 
to repurchase the obligations at lower values.3 
What are the costs? There may be some of 
importance. 
The first cost is related to what would hap-
pen to the banks and future access to credit. A 
generalized debt conversion into bonds, or a 
moratorium, would force the banks to write off a 
considerable part of the value of their loans to 
developing countries, much as would happen in 
a competitive market solution. This would imply 
heavy accounting losses for the banks. Moreover, 
the losses will be borne to a disproportionate 
extent by the big United States lending institu-
tions, which are the least diversified with respect 
to Latin American debt.36 
34See M. Guerguil, "Conversión de la deuda en bonos: 
una tentativa de evaluación", ECLA, Economie Development 
Division, mimeographed text, December 1983. 
55Ifrid. This relief is only potential because the burden 
also would depend on the value of the means of payment 
(foreign exchange) and hence the terms of trade. 
36See D. Wyss and R. Napier, "The world debt crisis and 
the U.S. economy", Data Resources U.S. Review, September 
1983, pp. 1.24-1.29. 
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These losses would probably prejudice fu-
ture access to credit. On the one hand, they 
would represent a serious threat to the solvency 
of many of the world's largest financial institu-
tions. These are unlikely to go bankrupt, thanks 
to the quick intervention of central banks, but 
uncertainties would paralyse all credit markets 
and spark a rapid major rise in interest rates 
from their already excessively high levels. This in 
turn could cause the debt crisis to spread to mar-
kets in the North, stifling economic recovery in 
the OECD area,37 and hence make the credit-
worthiness of Latin America even more prob-
lematical. 
On the other hand, creditors have long 
memories with regard to accounting losses, as 
witnessed by the reluctance of institutional inves-
tors to reenter the developing countries' bond 
market after their disastrous experience in the 
1930s. These negative repercussions are intensi-
fied in a modern banking system. First, there are 
the aforementioned negative externalities that 
make the crisis permeate the entire financial net-
work. Secondly, the losses would be dispro-
portionately concentrated in the big banks, which 
are the most internationally-oriented and to a 
large extent are responsible for mobilizing credit 
from the hundreds of small- and medium-
sized domestically-oriented banks that provide 
the bulk of loanable funds in the market. Further-
more, the big banks also have some control over 
bond markets since they frequently underwrite 
such instruments. In other words, if the big 
banks were estranged from Latin America, cred-
it would become extremely restricted'*8 even if 
there were an objective improvement of credit-
worthiness in Latin America. It is precisely for 
these reasons that a unilateral settlement of the 
debt crisis would seem attractive only under con-
ditions in which the alternative —bilateral re-
schedulings on fair terms— was not economically 
viable. 
As for the benefits of developing a secondary 
market, this possibility too is problematical. First, 
there is the question of who would purchase the 
paper.39 Secondly, a unilateral bond emission by 
one or several small borrowers would involve 
values that would be too low to support an effi-
cient secondary market. Although such action by 
a big borrower and/or many smaller borrowers 
could create values sufficient to form a secon-
dary market, the losses imposed on the banking 
system might be so large and immediate that in all 
likelihood primary and secondary markets 
would be in disarray for a considerable length of 
time, adversely affecting both access to new cred-
its and trading of old debt. 
Finally, not all countries are in a position to 
initiate a unilateral settlement. Just as in a bilater-
al settlement, there might be very high costs for 
an innovator in the form of retaliation from the 
banks and their governments. Probably, there-
fore, the unilateral option could be adopted only 
by i) a very large borrower which enjoys a "bal-
ance of terror" with the banks; ii) a country of 
considerable geopolitical significance to the 
North; and/or iii) a group of borrowing countries 
acting in conjunction. Once a precedent was set 
without retaliation, other countries could more 
easily follow similar repayment programmes. 
IV 
Final considerations 
T h e condi t ions necessary for a uni la teral 
approach to the debt problem are, in reality, 
fairly straightforward. Given the high degree of 
^Ibid. 
3 8There is, of course, the theoretical possibility of emit-
ting bonds on debts to banks that find such an arrangement 
acceptable, such as smaller United States banks and Euro-
pean institutions which have had less to do with Latin Amer-
pessimism reigning in certain circles as to the 
possibility of sustained recovery in the OECD 
ka. But this theoretical possibility is stifled by the legal re-
quirements of cross-default clauses which in practice leave all 
banks in the same boat. Moreover, this boat is piloted by the 
big United States institutions. 
" S e e Guerguil, "Conversión de la deuda ...", op.àt, 
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area, predictions of persistently high interest 
rates, and the severe economic deterioration in 
most Latin American countries, a unilateral solu-
tion may be tempting for a number of borrowers. 
Nevertheless, caution should be counselled. It 
would be premature to forecast the future direc-
tion of the world economy, and present difficul-
ties within Latin America should not be tackled 
with short-sighted strategies. It might prove wise 
to probe the banks respecting their attitude to-
wards a better rescheduling package along the 
lines suggested here. If they accept, countries 
would lose very little by signing such an agree-
ment. Should the world economy in fact move in 
40See O. Sunkel, "Past, present and future of the inter-
national economic crisis", in this same issue of the Review. 
a positive direction over 1984-1986, repayment 
capacity would be restored in most countries, 
and they could then pursue alternative, less 
heavily indebted routes to development without 
need for rescheduling. Furthermore, new credit, 
albeit not in the unusual volume of the 1970s, 
should be available if required. But if the OECD 
economies were to show definite signs to a re-
newed slump over 1984-1986, the borrowers 
would have a fairly clear picture of a difficult 
future ahead, making unilateral action —in the 
absence of an international public solution— the 
only prudent road to relief and future develop-
ment. Meanwhile, the cost of having waited to 
implement unilateral action in the form of a larg-
er debt would lose some of its relevance because 
values would be eroded by the softer repayment 
terms imposed upon the banks. 
